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Introduction
It would not be wrong if claimed that politics in the region of Mace-
donia and the Republic of Macedonia is historically founded on religion. 
The region itself carries a Byzantine theocratic legacy; for centuries it has 
been part of the Orthodox Empire in which the laws of God were imported 
to serve as laws of men. Later on, the pluralistic theocracy of the Ottoman 
Empire took place, in which belonging to one of the three confessions of 
the Book (Islam, Christianity, Judaism) were a mandatory condition and the 
equal of citizenship. If we contemplate about the emergence of nations and 
national loyalties among Orthodox Slavic speakers in the region of Macedo-
nia in the 19th century, we are again thinking about struggles between com-
peting national projects that, into a great extent, were reflected into the com-
petition of the respective national Orthodox Churches. If we take in account 
the establishment of the modern Macedonian statehood within communist 
Yugoslavia, then unavoidable is the paradoxical case of the Communist Par-
ty supervising and supporting the foundation of the national Macedonian 
Orthodox Church. If we observe the Macedonian independence and the de-
velopments during the last twenty years, again we face a period that has also 
been marked by political involvement of the Church. Even if we try to reflect 
on contemporary politics, we have to face the reality of the Church interfer-
ing the public space with the plans to build a temple on the main square in 
the capital of the country, and the reality of the inter-Church disputes be-
coming a burning political issue.
The initial idea of this paper was to examine solely the process of de-sec-
ularization, or counter-secularization in post-communist Macedonia. How-
ever, isolating the last two decades of events without an account on the his-
tory of Orthodoxy in the region might lead to only a partial conclusion about 
the role of religion and especially of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in 
contemporary Macedonia. As outlined above, religion has had a continuous 
importance in the major political and social developments and is inherent to 
the past of the region. Furthermore, another reason to look back in history is 
that the Church and its supporters mythologize its historical function today, 
and consider it to be essential for the existence of the nation. As we are go-
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ing to see, that opinion is shared by the two main political parties, but also 
by the vast majority of the population.
That is why the paper starts from a historical overview of the events 
related to the genesis, or the clamed genesis of the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church. In the section after, it focuses on the aspects of the political involve-
ment of the Church in post-communist Macedonia. It stresses the interfer-
ence of the Church within the public space as a paradigmatic case of de-
secularization of the Macedonian society. Finally, the paper discusses these 
findings in the light of secularization theory. The question it tries to address 
is to which extent it is acceptable to talk about de-secularization, since the 
premise is that – the stately formations of Macedonia have rarely been sepa-
rated from interference with Orthodoxy.
From Ohrid Archbishopric to the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church: A Critical Historical Observation 
on Institutionalized Orthodoxy in Macedonia
During the Byzantine era, until the 11th century, only one Orthodox 
institution existed – the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. It was 
the religious, but also the political authority in the territories under control. 
Although there was a temporary success with the establishment of a sepa-
rate Patriarchate by the Bulgarians in the 10th century (that for a certain 
amount of time was even autocephalous), still it was a short-lived attempt 
that was mostly a consequence of the emergence of the strong medieval Bul-
garian Empire. After Byzantines defeated Bulgarians, the Patriarchate was 
abolished.
The Byzantine Emperor Basil II has established the Ohrid Archbishop-
ric in 1019, another autocephalous Orthodox Church, subordinated to the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, in order for Constantinople to gain the loyalties of 
the rebellious Slavic realm. Ohrid at that time has been the center of the Or-
thodox Slavic culture. Clement, a student and follower of the work of the Sa-
lonika brothers Cyril and Methodius, who had invented the Cyrillic script, 
established religious schools among which the first Slavic University. In the 
years to come, most of the Slavic cultural production came from artists, writ-
ers, translators and scholars educated in Ohrid. A lot of sacred objects have 
been constructed there too. Today, it is claimed that there are exactly 365 
churches in the town (mostly in the old part), “one for each day of the year”. 
Being the basis for the medieval cultural advancement of the Orthodox pop-
ulations of the Balkans, Ohrid is today clamed as the cradle of both Mace-
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donian and Bulgarian national culture. Needless to say, these claims over the 
symbolic capital of Ohrid are to great extent contesting each other. Accord-
ing to Bulgarian historiography, the Ohrid Archbishopric was established as 
a sequel of the previously abolished Bulgarian Patriarchate. According to the 
official Macedonian version, it has been the predecessor of the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church.1
In the first decades of its existence, besides Greek, Church Slavonic has 
become a language of service and education in the institutions under the 
Archbishopric. Thus, when the Ottomans established control over the for-
merly Byzantine territories in the 14th and 15th century, in Macedonia there 
was already a division of the dioceses between the Patriarchate of Constan-
tinople and the subordinate Archbishopric of Ohrid. At the same time there 
was the Serbian Peć Patriarchate, which was established in the 14th century 
and later had Skopje as its center, as Serbian rulers succeeded in putting ter-
ritories of Macedonia under their control.2
The Peć Patriarchate was abolished in the 15th century by the Ottoman 
authorities, and the Slavic Orthodox population remained solely under the 
jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its subordinate, the Ohrid 
Archbishopric. However, in 1557 the Peć Patriarchate was restored with the 
help of the legendary Mehmed Paša Sokolović (a Slavic/Serbian born Grand 
Vezier), and many of the dioceses in northern and central Macedonia, pre-
viously administered by Ohrid, were transferred under Peć's jurisdiction.3
The education and the cultural (re)production among Orthodox Slavs in 
Macedonia, both during the Byzantine and consequently the Ottoman rule, 
was carried primarily by the Church institutions.4 This situation changed two 
centuries later, when in 1766 and 1767 respectively, the Sumblime Porte, be-
cause of the inefficient tax collection by the priests, abolished the Peć Patri-
archate and the Ohrid Archbishopric. After their abolishment, the only Or-
thodox institution left on the Balkans was the Ecumenical Patriarchate and 
Greek priests were appointed in the dioceses that used to belong to the Slavic 
churches.5 However, the presence of predominantly Greek priests did not have 
very significant cultural implication, as until the late 18th century and the 
coming of age of the European Enlightenment values, among them the idea 
of the nation and national consciousness, there was none or insignificant na-
tionalization of the role of the Christianity. Even in the period of the establish-
ment of the Greek state and after, there were many parties that were aware of 
the Universalist nature of Orthodoxy and did not agree with the attribution of 
national Greek features to the Ecumenical Patriarchate from Constaninople.6
Nonetheless, the nationalist principle has been gradually adopted in 
the Balkans and along with that, the religious institutions became agencies 
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of nationalism as well. The emergence of the Bulgarian Exarchate, and the 
formation of the Bulgar millet (1870), inaugurated a new politics of belong-
ing beyond religion – the ethnic/national one.7 Pretending to the political 
loyalty of the Slavic speaking population in Macedonia, the Bulgarian Ex-
archate was an obstacle for the Greek plans for expansion into Macedonia. 
Athens authorities by that time allied with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and 
stimulated its vivid engagement in the Greek foreign policy in Macedonia.8 
The influence of the Churches has had an effect in terms of nationalizing 
the population: the ones that had accepted the Bulgarian Exarchate, became 
Bulgarians; and the ones that remained loyal to the Ecumenical Patriarch-
ate became Greeks.9 At the same time, the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox 
Church was established in 1879 as another incarnation of the Peć Patriarch-
ate, but its effective influence over Slavic speaking population in Macedonia 
was not very significant.
In the late 19th and in the 20th century, however, the society started to 
become more open towards secular ideas, although the importance of the 
churches as political actors here is not to be disputed. However, a regional 
Macedonian intelegentsia emerged, which, since it was educated abroad, ad-
opted the idea of nation and started seeking national elements among the 
people of Macedonia. Regardless of the foreign influence, authentic discours-
es developed. In the first place there was the national liberation idea carried 
primarily by various paramilitary organizations, and later by the Macedo-
nian Revolutionary Organization, but by many writers and intellectuals as 
well, not necessarily related to the resistance.10  An important identification 
stream that has emerged among Slavic speakers from Macedonia in the 19th 
century, based on their linguistic and cultural specifications, presented by 
Dimitrija Čupovski and Krste Petkov – Misirkov. This idea, designated as 
“Macedonist”, later became a basis for the Macedonian Slavic nationalism. 
The Macedonists have suggested, as interpreted by Macedonian historiogra-
phy, that Slavs (Slavic speakers) from Macedonia had been a specific ethno-
cultural unit, that spoke its own specific language different than Bulgarian 
and it was their historical right to seek an independent country of their own, 
under the name of Macedonia. In 1903, Misirkov published the pamphlet On 
the Macedonian Matters, in which among other things, denounced Serbia, 
Bulgaria and Greece as enemies to Macedonians, argued against the calcu-
lations of the European powers over the fate of Macedonia and found fault 
with the methods used by the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization be-
cause they were too brutal and because they had cooperated with Sofia and 
the Exarchate. Misirkov also proposed the use of the central idiom of the 
Slavic language to be used as official by Macedonian Slavs and introduced in 
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schools and religious institutions. Thus he argued that the Church should be 
“one and only and Ecumenical, but not Serbian, Greek or Bulgarian”, and the 
possible solution for this problem related to the Macedonian Question would 
have been the restoration of the Ohrid Archbishopric.11
Misirkov's vision for the restoration of the Ohrid Archbishopric re-
mained unfulfilled during the course of the next several decades, marked 
by wars and intense political changes. The Macedonist stream gained politi-
cal power only for the first time in history after the establishment of Demo-
cratic Federal Macedonia and subsequently People's Republic of Macedonia 
as one of the federal units within Tito's Yugoslavia. Macedonian communist 
rulers at that time had adopted the Macedonist position towards the nation-
al question and started carrying out a Macedonist nation-building project.12 
The most important aspect of these efforts was the establishment of core 
institutions, such as the national university, Institute for National History, 
Academy of Sciences and Arts and among others, the Macedonian Ortho-
dox Church (MOC).
While communist regimes around Europe and the world were repress-
ing religion and destroying temples, in Yugoslavia and especially in Mace-
donia the case was quite the contrary. In 1958 and 1959, the dioceses that 
were on the territory of Macedonia and under the jurisdiction of the Serbi-
an Orthodox Church, gained autonomy but remained under the canonical 
rule of the Serbian Patriarch. Nevertheless, it was the official creation of the 
independent Macedonian Orthodox Church. Later on, in 1967, exactly two 
centuries after the abolishment of the Ohrid Archbishopric by the Ottomans, 
the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC), this time without the consent of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, but with the support of the Communist Party, 
has proclaimed autocephaly. As a result, the Serbian Church has never recog-
nized the autocephaly of the Macedonian and claimed that the Ohrid Arch-
bishopric has been its own trademark and historical legacy. Even today, the 
MOC is considered to be schismatic; the dispute has resulted in its isolation 
in the Orthodox commonwealth, as it still struggles for the recognition of its 
autocephaly by other Ecclecestial Churches.13
Nonetheless, while the MOC struggled in the Orthodox common-
wealth, it was well treated by the Yugoslav state. In the 1970s, the state award-
ed the MOC a parcel of land in downtown Skopje for the purpose of building 
a representative Cathedral, and has provided support in the protection of the 
monasteries with legal acts on the protection of the cultural heritage. At the 
same time, MOC had noted an important advancement among the Macedo-
nian Diaspora in the United States, Canada and Australia.
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Orthodoxy, Nationalism and Politics in the 
Macedonian Society: An Overview
According to Article 19 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedo-
nia, “religious communities and groups are separate from the state and equal 
before the law”.14 However, in reality, that has not been the case. The Mace-
donian Orthodox Church (MOC) has had an exceptionally salient political 
meaning in the contemporary Macedonian political discourse, and has act-
ed as if not separated from state institutions, and moreover, received a treat-
ment of being “more equal” than the other religious communities. That has 
been partially due to the fact that Orthodox Christians comprise the largest 
religious community in the country and the MOC is their representative in-
stitution. Furthermore, having in mind that there is an overlap between the 
ethnic and religious cleavages in the country, which on the other hand are 
the cornerstone of the Macedonian political system, MOC acts not only as 
a religious, but also as an ethnic organization. The main division along eth-
nic lines between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians corresponds to a great 
extent with the division between Orthodox Christians and Muslims, yet the 
equation between ethnicity and religion can be a false one. Although religion 
has been gradually incorporated as important aspect of the ethnic identifi-
cation, Albanian national movements in Kosovo and Macedonia have been 
rather based on the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, than on Islamist rhetoric. On 
the other hand, ethnic Macedonian nationalism has been traditionally tend-
ing to connect with the Church, as in all the cases of the Orthodox Common-
wealth.15 The MOC in this respect has had a defining role for the differenc-
es between ethnic Macedonians and surrounding predominantly Orthodox 
nations (Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks who have “their” respective Churches), as 
well as in relation with Muslims (Albanians in the first place).
The political role of the Church is grounded on the perception that it 
has played a crucial role in the formation of the Macedonian (ethno) national 
identity. Many people, including some of the major politicians refer to Mace-
donia as a “Land of the Bible”, narrative stemming from the passages in the 
Bible about St Paul’s activities in the region. It is also said that the Church has 
played a crucial role for the endurance of the Macedonian people during the 
so-called “Turkish yoke” (a popular phrase to describe the Ottoman rule), and 
that Orthodox Christianity has paved the way for the Macedonian indepen-
dence. However, from the historical overview it can be seen that the Church 
has been an institution of the system, even during the Ottoman rule. It also 
seems hard to logically relate the Church to the alleged Macedonian unique-
ness through the centuries, as the first autonomous Macedonian Church was 
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established in the late 1950s. In addition, the Church claims that it has been 
allegedly harmed by the communist expropriation of the private properties, 
which has led to the process of re-acquiring properties from the state (so 
called denationalization - the return of the expropriated estate during com-
munism). The logical fallacy is that the MOC in fact has been established only 
after the main expropriation actions took place and therefore could not be de-
prived of properties. Nonetheless, the Church has yet to obtain tremendous 
real estate, and has gotten involved in a lot of businesses, which make it the 
richest, ergo very influential “non-governmental” institution.16
The rhetoric of mythologization of Orthodoxy, accompanied by uncriti-
cal equation of the religion with the religious institutions is shared both by 
the nationalist and social democratic party, which have in fact created the 
Macedonian political discourse in the last 20 years. The ruling IMRO-DPM-
NU,17 in their party Doctrine from 2009, list faith as one of their eight core 
values and say that “spirituality, religion and faith are the eternal food of the 
Macedonian identity during all the turmoil that the Macedonian people has 
been going through. (...) Therefore, an exceptional place in the Macedonian 
state and society is given to the Macedonian Orthodox Church”.18 In a similar 
fashion, the opposition SDAM,19 in their recently promoted party platform 
beside praising secularism, state that they “see the Church as a key histori-
cal factor in the development and fortification of the Macedonian national 
identity”.20 Therefore, both of the parties actively take measures that show 
their devotion to the Church. For example, the IMRO-DPMNU has initi-
ated a Declaration for support of the efforts of the MOC to protect its unity 
and to demand recognition of its autocephaly that was later adopted by the 
Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia.21 With this act, the state has offi-
cially backed the Church in the dispute with other Orthodox Churches that 
do not recognize its legitimacy and autocephaly, departing from the prem-
ise of separation of the state and the religion. The former president Branko 
Crvenkovski, on the other hand, now an old-new leader of the opposition 
SDAM, when in power in 2007 has awarded the MOC with highest honors 
for special achievements and contribution to the benefit of the state.22 How-
ever, the official reason for the award was that the Church at that period was 
celebrating its 40th anniversary from the self-proclaimed autocephaly. The 
particular practical benefits of the work of the MOC were never mentioned.
Another noteworthy factor that has been dialectically related to the 
growing importance of the religious institutions in post-communist Macedo-
nia, most of all the MOC, is that religiosity among the population has been on 
the rise. Regardless of whether the political involvement of the MOC is a cause 
or a consequence of popular religiosity, it is important to stress that it has been 
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a process that corresponds with the attitudes of the majority of the people. As 
Cacanoska shows in a sociological survey, the majority of the people living in 
Macedonia are religious (less than 10% have said that they are not believers), 
they visit the temples on a regular or occasional basis (only 7% never go to 
temples at all) and to an extremely high level think that humanity does need 
religion.23 Cacanoska in her analysis sees the growing importance of religion in 
people’s everyday life as an indicator for the process of de-secularization of the 
Macedonian society, which she defines as a penetration of the spiritual into the 
established secular surrounding.24 The roots of this process, according to her 
are to be looked in the transformation of the political system and its values, as 
a response to the secular ideal during the Yugoslav era. The premise of the ac-
tual Yugoslav secularism is highly debatable (in the Macedonian case it was the 
Yugoslav communists that approved the establishment of the MOC), yet, the 
perceptions of the Yugoslav period as a “secular” or even “anti-religious” per-
sists. However, what Cacanoska implies in the study that people are intimate-
ly far more religious after the Yugoslav break-up than they used to be before. 
The MOC seniors themselves promote the rhetoric of the importance of 
the Church too. The metropolitan Kiril, the oldest bishop among the MOC 
leadership, in one interview has claimed that “[w]ithout the Church, there 
can be no survival of the people and the state”, that “the Macedonian [Or-
thodox] Church is our Macedonian soul”, and that “we are a Biblical coun-
try and Biblical people [...] elevated by God to the highest rank because we 
are mentioned [...] in the Bible.”25 Church representatives usually have pub-
lic appearances on every political issue, and are considered to be important 
political factors and opinion makers. According to an in-depth survey by the 
Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, in 2008 more than 65% 
of the population trusts the Church and the religious communities26. The 
only institutions that have enjoyed more confidence than the religious were 
those of the education, by a margin of less than a half percent.
Church seniors have therefore utilized their position of people-trusted-
by-the-people and gotten seriously involved in numerous political issues, be-
coming opinion-makers. In 2001, when the conflict between Albanian gue-
rillas and the Macedonian army broke out, the Church has issued several 
communiqués in which it has demanded heavier military action against Al-
banian guerillas, referring to them as “terrorists” and using very sharp lan-
guage. They had also manifested disbelief in the capabilities of the former 
President Trajkovski27. One of the reasons the MOC seniors confronted Tra-
jkovski during 2001 and later, was because of the fact that he was a Protes-
tant pastor. In several occasion, the metropolitan Peter has stated that Tra-
jkovski acts more like a Methodist, rather than as a president and that he has 
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led various “sects”, which has been another enemy of the Macedonian people 
besides “the Albanian terrorists”28.
An additional factor for the public to take the opinion of the Church 
during the conflict in 2001 very significantly was that many monasteries un-
der the jurisdiction of the MOC have been targets of guerilla's assaults. That 
has caused the MOC to promote itself as a victim of the military clashes and 
to adopt a position of an actor in the process. Nonetheless, instead of promot-
ing pacifism, forgiveness and reconciliation, the MOC has insisted that the 
state should wipe out “the terrorists” and take revenge, and promoted anti-
Western attitude although the least harmful solution for the conflict depend-
ed solely on the Western engagement in the peace process29. The Church had 
also objected during the signing and the implementation of the Ohrid peace 
Accords, which were intended to be the new social contract that the Macedo-
nian society should be built upon. The MOC's remarks were that the country 
should not submit to the illegitimate demands for constitutional changes and 
to maintain its “character” with regard to the provisions given to minorities, 
meaning that it should give primacy to the ethnic Macedonians30.
Another important aspect of the political role of the MOC, in a way re-
lated to the military conflict was taken during the inauguration of new police 
commanders in 2002. Nine priests, including the Archbishop of the MOC 
were blessing the newcomers to the special and anti-terrorist units, who had 
to swear in the name of God and ask for his mercy. Additionally, they were 
all given medals with the face of Jesus. The minister of Internal Affairs, lat-
er accused for war crimes in 2001, Ljube Boshkoski, for that occasion stated 
that Muslim officers were not obliged to accept the Jesus-faced medals31. In 
fact, that has not been the only case where religion was involved in state se-
curity. The police forces of the country in the meantime have proclaimed St. 
Demetrius of Salonika, a Christian martyr and military saint, as their official 
patron. Usually, on the day of St. Demetrius, Church seniors visit the police 
and hold ceremonies32.
The introduction of religion, the Church and priests into the state se-
curity forces is an act against the secularism in any way. At the same time, 
the exclusivity of the Orthodox Christian narratives that were introduced is 
against the multicultural character of the state. Moreover, the police are one 
of the layers of the public administration that has the most direct contact 
with the people on the field. If the police acquired an image of an Orthodox 
or MOC-affiliated institution, there is a great possibility that the institution 
would seize to represent the diversity of the Macedonian population.
The Church has been involved in many other political issues. In 2007, 
they have taken action in defense of the two Macedonian police commanders 
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that have been accused for war crimes in 2001 and sent to the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY), in the Hague. During the mass prayers for the 
savior of the souls of the two commanders, the Archbishop Stefan has made 
a controversial speech saying that “their trial is our trial and trial of our fa-
therland. They (...) have just defended their country (...) and it is never and 
nowhere a sin to defend your fatherland”33. The outcome of the trial is that 
one of the commanders Johan Tarchulovski has been sentenced for being 
responsible for the slaughter of innocent civilians, while Ljube Boshkoski, a 
minister of internal affairs at the time of the slaughter, was released. In the 
public, the prayers by the Church were seen predominantly as a patriotic act. 
However, no matter if one sees the speech of the Archbishop as patriotic or 
nationalistic, it is clear that the mass prayers and ceremonies for the savior of 
the accused commanders had a deeply political meaning and message, and 
meant a direct infiltration of the Church in the political sphere.
No less important aspect of the political de-secularization is to be looked 
at the case of repression towards the attempt to establish another Orthodox 
Church in the country. Namely, in 2002, Metropolitan Jovan, a former se-
nior in the MOC has agreed to engage in canonical unity with the Serbian 
Church, which was formulated as overcoming the schism that has happened 
with the un-canonical promulgation of autocephaly by the MOC in 196734. 
He soon established a so-called Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric, which has 
never been recognized nor by the MOC, nor by the Macedonian authorities. 
Quite the opposite, Jovan, backed only by several monks, was immediate-
ly said to be a traitor and schismatic by the MOC and started experiencing 
heavy stigmatization in the media and almost faced a public lynch. The po-
lice have immediately expelled him and his supporters from their residence 
with absence of the standard procedures and soon Jovan was put in front of 
the court, being accused for “inciting national, racial and religious hatred, 
schism and intolerance.” He was also arrested for “performing illegal activi-
ties” when he tried to baptize a newborn. Soon he was sentenced to eighteen 
months in prison, because of writing texts where he “slendered” the MOC, 
agreed to be appointed as an Exarch of the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric, 
and officiated a religious service in a private-owned apartment. The police 
demolished the improvised places of worship said to belong to his Church35. 
After serving almost eight months, parts of the verdict were ruled out as un-
constitutional and his prison time was shortened. In the meantime, Amnesty 
International has proclaimed him to be a prisoner of conscience36. Nonethe-
less, he was again sentenced upon accusations of the MOC, this time under 
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suspicion for money laundering. Jovan claimed that he never used the prob-
lematic donation, and the donor confirmed that themselves. However, after 
initially liberating him, the Court faced tremendous political pressure and 
in the third attempt, sentenced him to another two years in prison. Similar 
processes have been carried more recently against Jovan, but the lack of evi-
dences helped him for not being sentenced again37.
The infamous Jovan case, also known as the Vraniskovski case (based on 
his surname before joining the Church), has attracted a lot of attention and 
was exposed under the scrutiny of human rights activists. Besides Amnesty 
International, the main role in the defense of the rights of Jovan was played by 
the Helsinki Committee, who have reported the Jovan case as a serious vio-
lation of religious freedom, and also violation of the secular principles, since 
the state intervened on behalf of the MOC, and acted against the laws in the 
procedure against Jovan38. The issue attracts still a lot of attention, and what 
is noticeable is that both of the main political parties from the ethnic Mace-
donian campus are equally harsh in their rhetoric. As already mentioned, the 
Assembly has reached an agreement and voted a Declaration for support of 
the MOC related to the particular issue with the SOC, and the parties still try 
to prove which one has been more efficient in the protection of the Church.
The case of Jovan has also resulted in the adoption of a very illiberal law 
on religious institutions, where opposite of the European practice, the monop-
oly over the respective religions is assigned to the already existing institutions. 
The registration of a religious community from a confession from which there 
has already registered one is made impossible. As the Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights argues, the law is discriminatory towards for example, the Ohrid 
Orthodox Archbishopric of Jovan, and the Bekteshi Muslim minority, while 
it favors the two “state faith communities” - the MOC and the Islamic Faith 
Community39. The political involvement in the inter-Church dispute, has also 
affected the relations between Serbia and Macedonia. That had been flagged 
as a serious harm to the religious freedoms in the country. For example, Flo-
rian Bieber back in 1999 had noted that the state intervention in inner-church 
conflicts, and in the international affairs of the churches, as in the MOC-SOC 
dispute, leads to de-secularization, a condition “where the church gains a (rec-
ognized) role in the political sphere and society”40. The Macedonian Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights, when marking the path do de-secularization 
in Macedonia in 2005 has marked several milestones related to the particular 
case: the Declaration for the support of the MOC adopted by the Assembly; 
the refusal to recognize another Orthodox Church for the protection of the 
MOC; the adoption of an illiberal Law for religious communities and the offi-
cial rationale saying that “the case of (Jovan) Vraniskovski should not repeat”; 
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the abuse of the police forces in the case of inter-church dispute and finally, the 
verdicts against Jovan, that were motivated by political interest41.
Finally, one of the most recent points when the MOC and the govern-
ment have violated the secular principles was the attempt to introduce man-
datory religious education in elementary schools. The Constitutional Court 
ruled out the attempt as being against the Constitution of the Republic. As a 
result, the Archbishop of the MOC, together with representatives of the rul-
ing IMRO-DPMNU have heavily criticized the Constitutional Court, which 
has led to serious remarks in reports on the issue of the independence of 
the judiciary system. The MOC even announced that they would change 
the Constitution if necessary, fully backed by the government. In the case of 
the religious education, it was once again shown that the IMRO-DPMNU is 
ready to rather ally with the Church, than with the Constitution42.
The De-Secularization of Public Space as a Paradigm 
of the De-Secularization of Macedonian Society
Besides the involvement of the Church in the political and legal sphere, 
very typical non-secular practice in the Macedonian society is the occupa-
tion of public space by religious institutions. New temples are being built in 
many places, yet the MOC has had an exceptional role in this as well. While 
local communities, aided by private funding from locals and the Diaspora, 
build churches and mosques outside the capital, there have been two major 
cases that have interrupted this practice.
First, during 2002, the government under IMRO-DPMNU endorsed by 
the MOC, in joint effort erected a gigantic “Millennium” Cross on a public-
ly owned land on the top of mountain Vodno above the capital, Skopje. The 
Cross, 66 meters high, built on a twelve column platform (each of them for 
every one of the twelve apostles) and illuminated at night, was said to be a 
tribute to the “two thousand years of Christianity” in Macedonia, a narrative 
related to the passages in the Bible about St Paul’s activities in the region, and 
the already described myth of Macedonia as a “Land of the Bible”.
When visitors come to Skopje, usually one of the first images they get 
from the city is precisely the gigantic Millennium Cross at the top of the 
mountain, clearly visible from every angle and every district. It has sponta-
neously become the trademark of the city. However, Skopje has a very diverse 
demographic structure, as there are a lot of non-Orthodox communities re-
siding there. That image of Skopje roughly corresponds with the general de-
mographic structure of the country. In the whole Republic of Macedonia, 
91
Religion, Nationalism and Counter-Secularization
there are 65% of Orthodox Christians and 32% of Muslims43. The image of 
the cross stretching above the capital, therefore might not be representative 
in terms of the demographic composition of the population, yet it is an evi-
dence of the position of religions and official religious institutions in the po-
litical order. The Cross, besides the intention to make a tribute to the 2000 
years of Christianity, was meant to be a political claim in the post-conflict so-
ciety. It had implicit role of a territorial mark of the nationalist IMRO-DPM-
NU, or, as it popularly known it was meant, “to serve as a reminder to whom 
the city belongs”. It has become since an important national/political symbol 
for the ethnic Macedonian nationalists regardless of their party affiliation.
The construction of the Millennium Cross was one of the most vis-
ible actions of de-secularization, as the government not only put itself into 
a position of promoter of religion, but it also marked a highly visible public 
space with a religious symbol. Furthermore, as Daskalovski points out, it was 
constructed without consulting the public and without having any sensitiv-
ity for the differences as it promoted exclusively only one confession, which 
makes this move of the government illiberal and harmful for Macedonian 
multiculturalism44.
In a similar fashion, in the last few years of the second term of the IM-
RO-DPMNU in power has produced another idea, which has started com-
ing true – building an Orthodox temple on the central square in Skopje. The 
decision divided the public and was marked by protests. In March 2009, the 
opponents of the idea of constructing a temple were labeled in a television 
show as ‘a bunch of gays and atheists’. Such a description was a reaction on 
the effort of the opponents to organize a demonstration against the construc-
tion. The next day an allegedly spontaneous crowd of several thousands sup-
porters of the MOC gathered (led by Church seniors) and attacked the young 
protestants. Since then, there is an ongoing clash between the government 
and the urban social movements. Yet, the square has been recently set for 
construction and the works for the building of a church have started. As in 
the case of the Millennium Cross, the will of the people residing in the area 
was not taken into account, and the multicultural structure of the city popu-
lation has been neglected during the planning45.
The violation of public space is probably the most obvious act of de-sec-
ularization of the Macedonian society. While the de-secularization of politics 
is a discursive one, and therefore can be reversible and can be discussed and 
sanctioned, the construction of buildings is in many ways leaving a permanent 
trace, meaning a permanent loss for secularism. Although many experts in the 
field, domestic and foreign, point to the violation of secularism, probably a 
few would dare to intervene a posteriori, by removing the Cross from the top 
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of mountain Vodno or by demolishing the Church on the city square. These 
places, central for the urban landscape, have been turned from public into sa-
cred, and illustrate the best the process of the MOC taking over the physical 
space that used to belong to everyone. While the Church seniors and the Or-
thodox population might feel very pleasant with these developments, the state 
puts the rest of the population, not just members of other confessions, but also 
non-believers, into a de facto subordinated position to the MOC.
Concluding Remarks
It is undisputable that the Orthodox Church still plays a major political 
role in Macedonia. However, while there can be a case of so called clericaliza-
tion of the public sphere (a term very popular in Serbia, referring to the in-
creasing role of public personae of the Church seniors), it remains unclear to 
what extent there has been a de-secularization, or counter-secularization of 
the Macedonian society? One of the impressions from the overview of the his-
tory of the political significance of the Orthodox Church is that in fact, there 
was never a case when religion was totally absent from the public sphere. 
Even under Communism, falsely portrayed as a period of imposed antithe-
ism, there were incentives provided for the religion, and by religion I refer 
primarily to Macedonian Orthodoxy. The initial hypothesis of the paper was 
that there is a case of counter-secularization, meaning return of the religion 
in the public and political domain. The outcome of the research has led to the 
conclusion that there is an assertive tendency of overriding secular norms.
It seems that 2001 and the military conflict can be considered to be a 
break-through point in assessing the political role of the Church. Before the 
conflict, the interference of the MOC in the public domain was not as flagrant 
as it became afterwards. Starting from the political campaigning against Al-
banians, but also against the Methodist president Trajkovski, the Church ad-
opted a position of radical nationalism, and soon found itself blessing new-
comers to the special units and later praying for the officers accused of war 
crimes. Furthermore, the case of the renegade bishop Jovan has unmasked 
the intolerant and combative character of the MOC, which organized a hoax 
against him. The same case has demystified the political interest of the eth-
nic Macedonian parties behind the MOC too, as it has caused them to bring 
the intra-church and the inter-church disputes to the political institutions. 
As well, it was a demystification of the counter-secular tendencies of the 
state in general, as both the political and the judiciary system allied in the 
war against the “schismatic traitor”. Finally, the IMRO-DPMNU proneness 
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to mark public spaces with capital religious objects, such as the gigantic Mil-
lennium Cross on the top of mount Vodno, or the planned cathedral at the 
main square in Skopje, and its willingness to bring religion into schools, can 
serve as an evidence that behind the counter-secularist tendency there is a 
steady political force that is pushing religion deeper and deeper in the pub-
lic domain.
The final conclusion is that, although defined as secular, the post-com-
munist Macedonian society is in practice very de-secularized one, with the 
possibility of becoming a clerical one very soon. As religion is here not con-
sidered as inherently good or bad in advance, what is quite worrying about 
the Macedonian case is the intolerance, the monopolistic attitudes and the 
nationalistic sentiments demonstrated by the MOC.  In fact, with the coun-
ter-secularization process, the MOC has acquired a political role, and lost 
its ecclesiastical, ecumenical and charitable dimension. By turning towards 
nationalism, it has committed the sin of ethno phyletism, and has lost its 
universalistic Christian purpose – to spread love and compassion among 
humanity.
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